Abstract Liberalism and communitarianism have figured prominently in discussions of how to govern forensic DNA practices (forensic DNA typing and databasing). Despite the prominence of these two political philosophies and their underlying values, no studies have looked at the governance of forensic DNA practices in a nondemocratic country governed by a communitarian logic. To fill this lacuna in the literature, this article considers Singapore as an authoritarian state governed by a communitarian philosophy. The article highlights basic innovations and technologies of forensic DNA practices and articulates a liberal democratic version of "biolegality" as described by Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally. It goes on to consider briefly various (political) philosophies (liberalism and communitarianism) and law enforcement models (due process and crime control models). The main part of the article records the trajectory, and hence biolegal progress, of forensic DNA practices in Singapore and compares it with trajectories in England and the United States. The article concludes that Singapore's forensic DNA practices are organized according to the crime control model and therefore safety and the war against crime and terrorism trump individual rights and legal principles such as privacy, bodily integrity, proportionality, presumption of innocence. and onus of proof.
Introduction
Forensic DNA profiling, developed in the mid-1980s, was soon heralded as the "ultimate identification scheme" by the influential geneticist Eric Lander (1989) and has been subsequently considered as the "gold standard" for identification and individualization by lawyers and others (Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer 2000) . Since the late 1980s, several jurisdictions, predominantly in (but not limited to) liberal democracies, adopted forensic genetic technologies and, in most cases, legislation to govern them aimed to control crime and serve justice (see Hindmarsh and Prainsack 2010; Krimsky and Simoncelli 2011) . Legislative measures set provisions for, among other things, the conditions for obtaining bodily samples, the governance of DNA databases, and mechanisms for quality control of DNA profiling. Empirical research documented that the lines of development related to setting up DNA databases, and the inclusion of suspects and convicts onto those digital repositories are comparable in many jurisdictions and have formed a "common trajectory" (Williams and Johnson 2008: 1) . This common trajectory started with DNA typing being predominantly used as evidence to secure convictions and to clear the wrongfully accused. Subsequently, and following the establishment of DNA databases, as well as development of new profiling technologies, DNA became an increasingly important mechanism providing intelligence to state agents involved in criminal investigation. A current development is that jurisdictions seek mechanisms enabling the transnational exchange of DNA data held in national DNA databases. This trajectory of forensic genetics demonstrates a symbiotic relationship between biotech innovations and the law. Michael Lynch and Ruth McNally (2009; see also Machado, Santos, and Silva 2011; Lawless 2013; Machado and Costa 2013) coined the concept of "biolegality" to document this symbiotic relationship between science and law and to articulate how such technolegal progress redefines and renegotiates the criminal justice system, human rights, suspect bodies, and the credibility of various forms of evidence. They contend that biolegally marked bodies are both "object and product of policing and forensic expertise" and have the "potential to expand" (Lynch and McNally 2009: 284) . They argue that the notion of biolegality can also provide "broader insight into strains and adjustments that occur when a novel surveillance system is implanted in a liberal democracy" (285, emphasis added). This contribution provides a provisional account of biolegality in a jurisdiction that is governed according to principles different from those of liberal democracy.
Following the introduction of forensic genetics and laws to govern it, scholars from the social sciences, humanities, and law have been addressing forensic DNA typing and databasing (hereafter referred to as forensic DNA practices) and have generated a substantial body of literature. This work articulates, among other things, that forensic DNA practices are subject to technical and legal controversy (Jasanoff 1998; Lynch et al. 2008) , that provisions may comprise violations of constitutional rights (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; ECtHR 2008) , that the value and efficacy of DNA databases remain unclear (Human Genetics Commission 2009; McCartney, Williams, and Wilson 2010) , that DNA databases are a developing instrumentality for increased state surveillance (Williams and Johnson 2004) , that minorities populate DNA databases disproportionately (Ossorio and Duster 2005; Skinner 2011) , and that criminal investigative epistemologies in the forensic DNA era are subject to constant change (Williams and Johnson 2008) . These studies can be said to counter the dominant, contemporary forensic genetic discourse that these technologies are beneficial to society per se.
Despite these important studies, a large lacuna is present in the body of literature on forensic DNA practices: while all social scientific studies have focused on liberal democratic jurisdictions (e.g., the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, or Portugal), social scientific knowledge about forensic genetic practices in other parts of the world (e.g., Saudi Arabia, China, or Ukraine) is presently unavailable (see Heinemann, Lemke, and Prainsack 2012: 250; Jasanoff 2010) . 1 How those countries exactly implement and use forensic DNA practices is unknown. But that it differs becomes clear from a short and contemporary example.
The authoritarian regime of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced in October 2009 that it was planning to compile a DNA database with profiles from all of its 4.5 million residents (Youssef 2009) . 2 As such, the UAE has not followed the common trajectory mentioned above. The aims of the population-wide database are to control crime and to identify victims of a possible future mass fatality. It is currently unclear whether or not legislation has been passed or, based on remarks of the prospective director of the DNA database in an interview (Youssef 2009 ), whether setting up such a population-wide DNA database could be deemed a "security matter," in which case a security directive would render legislation unnecessary. It was estimated that the UAE forensic laboratory would be able to DNA type 1 million subjects a year and that the project would take a decade; in January 2011 the authorities proclaimed that they would commence gathering samples in 2012 (Dajani 2011) . As the government of UAE does not adhere to such principles as transparency and accountability of governance, more information about UAE's efforts to build a population-wide DNA database is currently unavailable.
Were these mechanisms in place, it would become possible to document whether the UAE authorities will ask its citizenry to volunteer biological samples or whether such sampling would be enforced using the strong arm of the law; whether the population-wide database applies to the elite as well, or to the less privileged, migrants, and tourists only; in what class of punishable crimes police will start collecting crime scene samples; and what rights subjects will have if a match is found between a subject's profile and a trace collected at a crime scene. All these tentative yet (presently) unanswerable questions are important, as forensic DNA practices pose challenges for civil liberties and may disproportionately harm vulnerable populations (Cole 2007; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007) . Also, they may provide state agencies with novel and powerful mechanisms for increased surveillance and, as 1 An extensive search on the Internet, as well as various scholarly databases, identified only four contributions on forensic genetics issues and practices in countries not located in the Global North (including Australia and New Zealand): De Ungria and Jose 2010 documents the Philippine experience regarding emerging forensic DNA practices; Parven 2012 examines, among other things, the forensic use of DNA information in a developing country (Bangladesh); Zar, Shahid, and Shahzad 2013 provides an overview of crimes, terrorism, and forensic genetics in Pakistan; and South African scholar and advocate Meintjes van der Walt (2011) discusses several legal, ethical, and societal aspects of forensic genetics in South Africa. 2 Following UAE in its decision, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Bermuda are said to also have proposed including their entire population in a national DNA database; see Gruber 2012. Even the former British prime minister Tony Blair called for including every citizen in a forensic DNA database in 2006 (see Jones 2006) . such, may further the asymmetrical power relations between subjects living in the UAE and its state agencies and governing elite.
This article is a first attempt to fill the above-mentioned lacuna, by documenting the trajectory of Singaporean forensic DNA practices and comparing this trajectory with the development of forensic DNA practices in England and Wales (hereafter referred to simply as England) and the United States. Comparing the trajectories of relevant biolegal progress in Singapore, England, and the United States also takes account of their locations within two different political systems. England and the United States are considered full-fledged democracies, yet Singapore is not. Where England and the United States respect human rights, Singapore is reported to violate basic civil rights. 3 The question this article addresses is whether it is possible to discern a version of biolegal progress in Singapore that differs from liberal democratic biolegality. To answer this question, the article first considers the use of forensic DNA typing technologies in liberal democracies before discussing two sets of principles contributing to forensic DNA governance and practice. Details of Singapore and its forensic DNA practices are presented in the main section. The article concludes that Singapore's forensic DNA practices are organized according to the crime control model and therefore safety and the war against crime and terrorism trump individual rights and legal principles such as privacy, bodily integrity, proportionality, presumption of innocence, and onus of proof.
Forensic DNA Typing Technologies in Liberal Democracies
In the mid-1980s, Sir Alec J. Jeffreys and his coworkers invented a method for individualizing human biological material, which they described as "DNA fingerprinting" (Jeffreys, Wilson, and Thein 1985) . DNA fingerprint techniques were notorious for several analytical problems and interpretive complexities (Lander 1989) , but many of these drawbacks were technically resolved in the mid-1990s when tandemly reiterated DNA sequences, or short tandem repeats (STRs), replaced the previously used DNA fingerprinting techniques. STR profiles had several advantages over DNA fingerprints, one of the most important being that STRs could be determined exactly and numerically. Consequently, STRs could be stored digitally and therefore set a condition of possibility for digitally uploading these profiles in forensic DNA databases. Because of the capacity of DNA databases to match DNA profiles obtained from crime scene traces (DNA traces) to DNA profiles from known individuals (DNA subject profiles), forensic genetics not only has been utilized as evidence in courts but also provides the police with intelligence, as subject profiles may match DNA traces originating at unsolved crimes.
As soon as STRs were considered as viable forensic markers, geneticists of the European DNA Profiling Group coordinated efforts to standardize (and validate) STRs throughout European nations. They made several recommendations to include specific STRs in DNA typing kits (e.g. Gill et al. 2000) , which were followed up by a multitude of stakeholders. First, biotech companies (e.g., Promega, Applied Biosystems) developed so-called multiplex DNA typing systems incorporating validated STRs (and PCR; see below). Second, the Council of the European Union issued resolutions endorsing further standardization of STRs throughout the European Union, consequently enacting the European Standard Set (ESS) (EU Council 2009). 4 And third, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed DNA database management software that includes the ESS; the FBI has also made the software freely available to other law enforcement authorities in the United States and beyond (FBI 2012a) . Thus, forensic geneticists, policy makers, biotech companies, and law enforcement officials made a concerted effort to standardize STRs globally (Prainsack and Toom 2013: 75) .
The invention of a technology to replicate biological material in vitro-usually called polymerase chain reaction (PCR; see Mullis 1990; Rabinow 1996) -rendered it possible to do forensic DNA analysis on biological material other than blood and semen, as was previously the case. This contributed to two new possibilities. First, DNA profiles could be obtained from biological traces, like saliva present on cigarette butts and soda cans or skin cells from clothes. Such items are often collected at scenes of less severe crimes (volume crimes like burglary, car theft), and hence the availability of PCR importantly added to forensic genetics' capacity to be applied in the investigation of less severe criminal activities. Second, and connected to the first, blood of subjects was no longer required, as equally reliable DNA profiles could now be determined from saliva. Taking a sample of saliva is, by many policy makers and other stakeholders, considered a less severe violation of one's body and bodily integrity compared with the mandatory taking of a blood sample. The availability of PCR hence importantly limited some of the ethical and legal concerns that surrounded the taking of subject samples.
Forensic DNA practices as discussed so far aim to match traces collected at crime scenes to reference samples obtained from subjects; they are technologies for identification through individualization. In recent years, new genetic insights, the availability of large population genetic databases, and technological innovations developed in the application of DNA technologies aimed at clustering potential suspects (Cole and Lynch 2006; M'charek 2008; Toom 2012a) . One application regards searching for possible familial relations between the unknown originator of a DNA trace and known subjects in the database (referred to as familial searching). 5 Familial searching is based on the fact that DNA profiles of biological families are expected to be statistically more similar than DNA profiles originating from two unrelated individuals. This knowledge can be used in criminal investigations where a DNA trace is uploaded to the database but does not match any other subject profile (see Maguire et al. 2014) . A custodian may subsequently, and according to legislative or regulatory provisions, search for near matches: similar yet not identical DNA profiles (cf. Bieber, Brenner, and Lazer 2006: 1315) . If a near match between a crime scene sample and a subject profile already included in a database is identified, it may be possible that a sibling, parent, or child of the known subject is the originator of the crime scene sample; it renders that specific family suspect. Yet since familial searching is based on statistics and shared genetic markers, there is also a significant chance that all members of the identified potentially suspect family are innocent and hence have nothing to do with the crime under investigation (Curran and Buckleton 2008) .
This section succinctly documents how forensic DNA practices were first aimed at evidence and later also at producing intelligence, that these technologies were first used in severe and violent crimes and later also in volume crimes, and that DNA typing technologies are aimed not only at individualizing subjects but also at clustering potential suspects and suspect families. An additional development is that national forensic DNA practices are now also rendered in international practices, given current transnational exchange programs (Bellanova 2008; McCartney, Wilson, and Williams 2011; Toom 2010, 2013) . These four advances have all been documented in the development of forensic genetics in liberal democracies. The term liberal democracy, as used here, covers a broad set of features. First, in this article it is considered a location, namely, countries situated in what is often called the Global North. Second, it refers to a political system of a state adhering to such standards as democratic institutions, rule of law, effective participation of the public, logic of equality, enlightened understanding of policy and its alternatives, and control over the political agenda (see Dahl 1998) . Third, in this article liberal democracy is considered a political philosophy (i.e., liberalism) aimed at protecting individuals from too much interference by state agents through providing the former with individual rights that cannot be breached by the latter without democratically agreed upon rules. Consequently, forensic DNA typing technologies provided the conditions of possibility for these applications. However, in many jurisdictions it would be legally impossible to apply these technologies in law enforcement practices since the use of such technologies is limited by, for example, individual rights, legal principles, particular understandings of ethical conduct, and fiscal resources. To overcome such constraints, many national parliaments enacted forensic DNA typing laws and policies for the use of these technologies (see Santos, Machado, and Silva 2013) . Indeed, the resulting practices are liberal democratic articulations of biolegal progress. It is interesting to note, however, that the literature on the governance of forensic DNA practices often refers not only to liberalism but also to communitarianism (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; Human Genetics Commission 2009). 6
Sets of Principles Guiding Governance and Practice of Forensic Genetics
Scholarly debates regarding the governance of forensic DNA practices commonly focus on one of two sets of principles. The first set stems from a cautious attitude toward the state and its monopoly on the use of violence and institutions liable to utilize those powers (Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 1984: 33) , which "results in the perceived need for institutionalized checks and balances" (Ho 2010: 244) . To protect subjects against these powers, individual rights such as liberty, autonomy, and privacy are emphasized. Consequently, this model advocates a strong orientation toward socalled due process criminal justice practices in order to prevent innocent individuals from being unfairly treated. The model leans heavily on the requirement for the state to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and emphasizes the presumption of innocence principle (Beyleveld 1997: 9; Ho 2010) . The second set of principles assumes that the state and its institutions can be trusted to a great extent, and hence it has a predisposition to assume that a strong state is the best guarantee for the "common good," sometimes defined as the greatest benefit for the greatest number. This second set of principles is more inclined toward a crime control model as a mechanism to deter or repress crime and to swiftly and efficiently administer justice to offenders (Fitzgerald and Ellsworth 1984: 33 -34; Beyleveld 1997: 8 -9; Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013: 506) . Whereas the first set of principles favors individual rights, the second set stresses the collective good. The former is often associated with liberalism and the latter with (forms of) communitarianism (Beyleveld 1997; Etzioni 2004 Etzioni , 2006 Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013) .
Since liberalism and due process, on the one hand, and communitarianism and crime control, on the other hand, are two ideal model types, there is always interplay of the positions in practice-they are simultaneously present (Van Houdt and Schinkel 2013 ). Yet accentuating either the liberalist-due-process or the communitarian-crimecontrol set of principles makes a difference. For instance, sociologist and influential advocate of communitarianism Amitai Etzioni rather naively remarked (or at least from an STS perspective) that "DNA usages will lead not only to more convictions, but also to fewer crimes being committed in the first place, which is the best of all worlds. In short, the benefits to public safety of DNA usages are very substantial " (2004: 201) . In short, public safety, or so Etzioni argues, is regarded as more important than protection of individual rights. From such a position, it is only a small step to argue for a population-wide DNA database to control crime (and, additionally, to identify victims of disaster), as the example of the UAE population-wide DNA database demonstrates. Etzioni's claim and the UAE project both show that the common good defined as controlling crime (potentially) trumps the individual, their rights, and due process. In other jurisdictions, where individuals and due process are weighted more heavily than plain safety or the "war against crime," forensic DNA practices may be rolled out more prudently, such as in the United States and the Netherlands (Aronson 2010; Toom 2012b ; see also Santos, Machado, and Silva 2013) .
Forensic DNA Practices in Singapore
The present contribution is the first STS article to address the history, legislation, trajectory, and utility of forensic DNA practices in a country not organized according to liberal democratic ideals. More specifically, it considers Singapore as an authoritarian state advocating communitarianism and pursuing the crime control model. The city-state also makes an interesting case study to document biolegal progress, as it has been the first jurisdiction implementing forensic DNA practices in the Southeast Asian region and hence provides a potential model for rolling out forensic DNA practices in other countries in that region. A third reason for studying Singapore is that its government is English speaking, which renders all kinds of written documents accessible for research. In addition, government officials can be interviewed in English-or at least in theory; the practice of considering Singapore as a case study proved to be extremely unruly, which posed methodological challenges.
A two-month research trip to Singapore (September and October 2011) was planned to collect relevant documents, as well as to interview ten to fifteen officials of the Health Sciences Authority, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law, the Attorney-General's Chambers, the Law Society, Supreme Court, Singapore Police Force, and human rights organizations. I anticipated that interviews with officials would include (general) questions about legislation, operational activities including the national DNA database, the prospect of international cooperation, and ethical issues. The aim of these interviews was to articulate how Singapore's communitarian approach to governance and politics gives shape and content to Singapore's forensic DNA practices; furthermore, I considered these "moments of contact" as opportunities to gather additional policy documents. In other words, would it be possible to discern a communitarian version of Lynch and McNally's (2009) liberal democratic concept "biolegality"? Yet what I severely underestimated was that officials in some jurisdictions do not adhere to such governing principles as transparency and accountability. In other words, as recently stated by criminologists Maggie Lee and Karen Joe Laidler (2013: 148) , some Asian countries may be "reluctant to open the doors to researchers for cultural, political and economic reasons . . . particularly [for] those with a critical perspective." Such is also the case for Singapore or, as I experienced, at least where it concerns questions about its law enforcement practices and human rights issues. In total, more than forty e-mails were sent to over twenty different officials, which were followed by many more telephone calls. All officials asked for more information, but no one subsequently consented to being interviewed. As such, this article is based on publicly available resources, including transcripts from Parliamentarian debates, legal provisions published in the Government Gazette, news items from the national news paper Straits Times, verdicts and jurisprudence, and official publications from Singapore's government agencies. Consequently, this article documents the lines of development of Singapore's forensic DNA practices, provisionally articulates how communitarianism shapes policy and governance of Singapore's forensic DNA practices, and also considers how communitarian versions of biolegality became, in the case of Singapore, enacted through "technical developments, government legislation, policing practices and appeal court rulings" (Lynch and McNally 2009: 285) .
An Authoritarian Communitarian State
Singapore, a city-state just north of the equator in the Southeast Asian region, is populated by approximately 5 million people. It is regarded as a very prosperous and safe country, scoring high in all lists that record the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and crime rates. 7 On the other hand, the city-state performs poorly in several democratic and human rights lists. It is qualified as a "partly free" democracy and "authoritarian state" by Freedom House (2012) and Human Rights Watch (2012). The US Department of State reported that "preventive detention, infringement of citizens' privacy rights, restriction of speech and press freedom and the practice of self-censorship by journalists, restriction of freedoms of assembly and association, limited restriction of freedom of religion, and some trafficking in persons" are still urgent issues that need to be resolved (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2010). In addition, Amnesty International regularly reports that Singapore's legal system still mistreats prisoners and that it tortures and executes convicted offenders (see Amnesty International 2011). Thus, according to human rights and democratic indexes, Singapore does not qualify as a (liberal) democracy. This observation corresponds with conclusions by political scientists, who classify Singapore as an "illiberal democracy" (Ortmann 2011: 153) and as a facade democracy in order to conceal "authoritarian governance" (Schedler 2009: 381) .
Asian values have been promoted as governing principles by Singapore's governing elite. The former president Lee Kuan Yew argued in an interview that Eastern societies "believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. He is not pristine and separate. The family is part of the extended family, and then friends and the wider society" (quoted in Zakaria 1994: 113). As such, the individual is always implicated in the wider social network, in the community. Asian values foster a communitarian approach to policy and governance (cf. O'Dwyer 2003: 42) . Because Singapore curtails individual rights and political liberties to maintain social order, this article considers Singapore as an "authoritarian communitarian" state (see Etzioni 2011: 17) . This claim is further substantiated by official publications of Singapore's government, statements of its elite, and analyses of various scholars, which all indicate that Singapore applies communitarian principles to governance (see Zakaria 1994; Tan 2000: 102; Chua and Shing 2003: 211; Lee 2008: 356, 373) .
Apart from the political system being based on authoritarian forms of communitarianism, the underlying values of Singapore's criminal justice system mirror, according to a retired attorney general of Singapore and former chief justice of Singapore, the "crime control model" (Keong 2000: 28) . The judiciary has been classified as "coldly efficient" (Siyuan and Chua 2010: 99) , severely affecting the balance between due process and the crime control model, which "is struck by heavily weighting the crime control side of the scales with broadly defined criminal laws, which utilise presumptions against the accused and contain harsh punishments" (100). The lack of sufficient due process mechanisms has even been documented in capital cases (Hor 2004) . 8 The government has allegedly been willing to exchange "respect for human rights for better crime control, to barter expensive, time-consuming trial 7 For an overview of GDP, see Wikipedia 2012. Singapore had between 0.3 and 0.6 homicides per 100,000 capita in the 2000s, according to data of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012); other statistical databases rank Singapore as third (Numbeo 2012) and sixth (Legatum Institute 2012) on safety and security indexes. 8 Another example demonstrating that Singapore's judiciary is not impartial regards the conviction of research journalist Alan Shadrake in 2010, a verdict that was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Muhammad v. Public Prosecutor (2011); see Barkham 2011. processes for the efficiency of administrative decisions" (Hor 2001: 28) . In other words, the crime control model seems to be weighted heavier than due process mechanisms. As described below, Singapore's authoritarian communitarian approach to policy and governance and its disposition to foregrounding the crime control model are conducive to a very restrictive forensic DNA practice.
Introducing Singapore's Forensic DNA Practices
Singapore has been a regional forerunner in implementing and using forensic DNA typing. It set up a forensic DNA laboratory in 1990, and DNA evidence was accepted in Singaporean courts in 1991. DNA experts from Singapore's Health Sciences Authority (HSA) assisted in efforts to identify the victims following the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. Other officials have been involved in training forensic DNA analysts (and other practitioners) from the Southeast Asian region. It was also the first Southeast Asian country with specific forensic DNA legislation-the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act of 2003-and a national DNA database.
The HSA Biology Division runs two laboratories: the DNA Profiling Laboratory and the DNA Database Laboratory. Both laboratories meet all contemporary international standards and obtained accreditation from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board in 1996 (HSA 2012a). Accreditation is aimed at demonstrating that a specific laboratory meets ISO 17025 standards, which apply to management, personnel, quality system, operational and technical procedures, equipment, and physical facilities. 9 So trust, an essential element of communitarian governance (Beyleveld 1997; Etzioni 2004 Etzioni , 2006 , is partly distributed to procedural mechanisms. Accreditation does, however, not rule out that mistakes are being made, as illustrated by an HSA announcement in January 2012: The HSA "has initiated the re-test of the DNA samples of 87 criminal cases as a precautionary measure. . . . This re-testing was initiated following HSA's discovery that a reagent of higher than usual concentration . . . was prepared and used as part of the DNA testing process in its DNA Profiling Laboratory . . . from October 2010 to August 2011" (HSA 2012b; see also Attorney-General's Chambers 2012). Following the announcement, Singapore's health minister, Gan Kim Yong, apologized for what was called a "blunder" (Yuen-C 2012). Such may be regarded as a motion of no confidence and hence detrimental for the public trust of Singapore's citizenry in Singapore's government in general and the HSA in particular.
A senior science writer of the national newspaper Straits Times observed that "most locals have great faith in the criminal justice system of Singapore," yet this error also proved that Singapore's agents occasionally do make mistakes, and hence the possibility of a miscarriage of justice "seems to have surfaced" (Ho 2012) . 10 Based on this conclusion, the science writer made a plea for implementing postconviction DNA testing in Singapore. Another Straits Times writer praised the laboratory manager responsible for the error for reporting it to the management; this second writer also appreciated the HSA's response for calling "all relevant government agencies to review the import of the mistake and take steps to rectify the wrong. This kind of personal and institutional integrity to admit wrongdoing and take steps to fix a wrong goes a long way to help the public maintain confidence in the HSA" (Khalik 2012 ). Contributors to online forums stressed that they also valued the response of the HSA and emphasized that HSA's admittance of the error would contribute to "inculcate a culture of not afraid of being transparent" (VR Forums 2012). Thus, apart from an appreciation of the HSA being transparent, these and many other responses also articulated a general lack of transparency of Singapore's institutions in general and law enforcement authorities in particular. . In addition, bodily samples for DNA profiling can also be obtained from individuals who are arrested and detained without a trial according to the widely criticized Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Act. 11 Apart from (mandatory) bodily sample collection, the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act sets provisions for individuals volunteering a sample when they were present at the scene of a crime (e.g., for elimination purposes) or when they are being questioned in connection with a crime (e.g., in a so-called DNA mass screening where law enforcement authorities request people to volunteer a DNA sample in attempts to find a culprit).
Singapore's forensic national DNA database is owned by the Singapore Police Force; the HSA is in charge of its daily management. All DNA profiles obtained are uploaded to the database. DNA profiles from acquitted or discharged suspects should be removed; originators of subject profiles who die or who reach the age of one hundred should also be removed. Although the deletion of DNA profiles from the database from those arrested and accused of a crime but never convicted is required by the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act of 2003, there are no provisions for destroying biological samples of innocent individuals. It is therefore assumed that a large collection of bodily samples of those considered innocent are retained indefinitely by the HSA. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom (ECtHR 2008) ruled it disproportionate and unnecessary in a democracy to indefinitely retain DNA profiles and biological samples (as well as fingerprints) of those individuals who were once arrested but never convicted of a crime. In other words, the indefinite retention of forensic bodily samples in Singapore from those considered innocent is regarded as a disproportionate measure from a liberalist and human rights perspective.
Having set the legal landscape, the next question to be answered regards the expansion of Singapore's DNA database. Unfortunately, the registrar of the database does not regularly provide the public with available data about size and structure of the database. 12 Upon commencement of the Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act in February 2003, the HSA received 14,000 blood samples from all prisoners, which were subsequently DNA typed and uploaded to the database (Tan-Siew et al. 2007 ). Table 1 summarizes available data for DNA databases of Singapore, England and Wales (National DNA Database; NDNAD), and the United States (Combined DNA Index, CODIS) FBI 2012b; Home Office 2012. Based on these figures, some provisional inferences can be drawn regarding the uploading of subject profiles in Singapore. First, the size of Singapore's database relative to its population currently is smaller than that in NDNAD and similar to that in CODIS. Second, since Singapore's database went live in 2003 and the NDNAD and CODIS in 1995 and 1998, respectively, Singapore's expanded much faster than CODIS yet slower than the NDNAD. 13 Concerns over "liberty and privacy" in the United States have importantly contributed to the relative slow expansion of CODIS (Aronson 2010: 257) and hence may be considered an articulation of a liberal democratic biolegality. 14 In contrast, the regimes for inclusion in England have been termed the "end of innocence" (Williams and Johnson 2008: 87) , which provides a rational for the substantial relative size of the 12 See Hor (2001: 38, 39 ) for another example of Singapore's government being deficient in providing information about the criminal justice system, in particular, information regarding capital and corporeal punishment. 13 These inferences are based on a simple estimation of the percentage of the population added per year on average since the launch of each national database: Singapore, 0.432% per annum (3.89%/9 years); England, 0.588% per annum (10%/17 years); United States, 0.25 per annum (3.5%/14 years). 14 CODIS is likely to expand faster since the 2013 Maryland v. King judgment of the US Supreme Court, which decided that obtaining arrestee's DNA is a legitimate procedure under the Fourth Amendment: "When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold a suspect for a serious offense and bring him to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment" (Supreme Court of the United States 2013).
NDNAD. The end of innocence claim was acknowledged in the above-mentioned S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR 2008). It rendered the English practice of indefinitely retaining DNA profiles and bodily samples (as well as fingerprints) of those considered legally innocent unlawful. The coalition government subsequently drafted the Protection of Freedoms Bill, which came in force in 2012 (McCartney 2012; Toom 2012b) , thereby reinstalling measures aimed at protecting individuals and hence shifting toward a liberal democratic and due process approach. Consequently, data of more than 1 million innocent persons must be removed (GeneWatch 2012) . Once these profiles are cleared from the NDNAD, it will still hold the largest percentage of a national population in a liberal democracy. Although liberal democratic biolegality is conducive to a proportional forensic DNA practice, the pre-Marper situation demonstrates that it is a thin line between proportionate and disproportionate interferences with subjects' rights.
It is hard to predict exactly how large Singapore's database will become, because of the lack of available information. This is a problematic issue when considered from a communitarian perspective. For instance, Etzioni argues that "the good communitarian society has two key elements: a carefully crafted balance between liberty and the common good as well as between individual rights and social responsibilities, and a social order based as much as possible on moral persuasion as opposed to coercion" (2006: 215, emphasis added). He continues to argue that especially the second element-the need for moral persuasion concerning policy measures-is quintessential for what he terms the good communitarian society. More specifically, he contends that the basis for "legal, policy and ethical deliberations . . . needs to be and can be found most effectively through dialogue" (215). Dialogue is possible only if sufficient information on a policy issue is publicly available. Since the Singaporean authorities do not provide such information routinely, and since they do not consent to being interviewed on governance and practice of forensic genetics, it is impossible for the government to morally persuade the citizenry about the best way to roll out forensic DNA practices; it is a biolegality defined by the absence of moral persuasion. The performance of DNA databases is a recurrent topic that has spurred much debate (e.g., Human Genetics Commission 2009; McCartney, Williams, and Wilson 2010) . Challenges that hinder assessments of DNA databases on their own or in combination with other databases include, for example, various national legal frameworks, different regimes for removing subject and trace profiles, various definitions of hits and matches and how they are counted, how matches are followed up, how many matches result in a verdict, and whether the crime would have been detected without DNA (for more information, see ENFSI 2012). However, despite these and other challenges, measurements are possible. One performance indicator, as advocated by the influential European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), is the socalled stain-person matches per person (total of matches between biological traces and persons divided by total of persons in the database; see ENFSI 2012). This measure requires information about the total number of DNA subject profiles and DNA traces in a database and the amount of matches generated by comparing them. Unfortunately, the HSA does not make such data publicly accessible, so it is impossible to compare the performance of Singapore's DNA database with that of the NDNAD or CODIS (0.074 and 0.017 respectively; see Table 1) .
Hence, Singapore's governance of the database is also deficient in Etzioni's first key element: the balance between liberty and the common good. This balance can be evaluated only if performance outcomes of the DNA database are available. On one occasion the HSA reported that DNA matches had contributed to solving 350 crimes since the database launch in 2003 (Quek 2009 ). Solving 350 crimes through a DNA match is not an insignificant result, yet compared with the NDNAD and CODIS stainperson matches-409,715 and 187,700, respectively-it is an outright poor outcome. One can only hypothesize about the reason for the produced matches lagging behind in the specified period. The most likely explanation is that Singapore's national DNA database lacks a balanced ratio between subject profiles and DNA traces. This hypothesis is backed up by a comparative and partly quantitative study that suggests it is likely "that a more effective means of increasing hit rates is to increase the number of crime-scene profiles uploaded into the database rather than continue to add more suspects and arrestees (and convicts to lesser crimes) to the database net. The latter does improve the hit rate somewhat, but the former improves it much more" (Goulka et al. 2010: 20 ; see also Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007: xvi). Put differently, if authorities want to increase hit rates, they need not only to upload subject samples but also to invest in collecting DNA traces at crime scenes.
If this hypothesis is true, three possible explanations may provide insight into the imbalance of the ratio of subject profiles to DNA traces. First, since crime rates are low in Singapore, it may result in only very few DNA traces collected. Second, most criminal cases are being solved, so the database has a very small percentage of DNA traces (as DNA traces of solved crimes are typically removed from the database after a case is closed). Third, law enforcement authorities embrace a forensic DNA practice focused on including a substantial part of the population in the national DNA database instead of collecting DNA traces at crime scenes aimed at achieving a balanced ratio between subject profiles and DNA traces. Whereas the first hypothesis would challenge a further expansion of the DNA database since not as many crimes are being committed, the two subsequent explanations would fit Singapore's law enforcement authorities' practice of embracing forensic DNA to subject a large percentage of its citizenry to genetic surveillance as a mechanism to control crime.
Familial Searching
The above-mentioned trajectory of forensic DNA practices refers not only to inclusion regimes to the database but also to applications of forensic DNA technologies. As documented in section 2, new interpretive schemas for DNA typing are available. One such application, familial searching (i.e., searching for near matches as a proxy for a biological relation between a DNA trace and a subject profile), has been utilized in criminal enquiries in Singapore.
The Registration of Criminals (Amendment) Act of 2003 does not forbid familial searching, yet the extent to which Singapore's law enforcement authorities use this mechanism is currently unknown. However, that familial searching has occurred becomes clear from two empirical sources. The first concerns a judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Muhammad bin Kader and Another v. Public Prosecutor (2011), which reports that after an elderly lady was found murdered in her flat in 2005, a man was arrested and soon confessed responsibility. If murder is proven in Singapore, the mandatory punishment is the death penalty. DNA typing proved to be enormously potent in this case for two reasons. First, the DNA profile of the suspect did not match traces recovered from the victim, and hence DNA typing contributed to clearing his involvement in this capital crime. Second, although the suspect's DNA profile did not match the DNA trace, it revealed some remarkable similarities. Similar yet not identical DNA profiles may indicate a biological relationship between the originator of the trace and the subject whose DNA profile is compared with the trace. A HSA DNA analyst subsequently notified the police about the near match and informed them that a sibling of the suspect possibly was the originator of the crime scene trace (Muhammad v. Public Prosecutor 2011) . Based on these findings, the brother of the first suspect was arrested and convicted for the homicide. Since the court did not question the HSA analyst's conduct of informing the police about the near match, we can conclude that this form of familial searching is legally allowed in Singapore. Second, apart from coincidental near matches, the HSA has been utilizing algorithms to search the database for potential biological relatives, as reported in a recent HSA annual report: "The DNA Database Laboratory scored a first in the use of a new genetic algorithm, familial searching, in the tracing of a murder suspect through his relatives in the criminal database" (HSA 2011: 60) . Any further information about the specifics of this investigation and court proceedings are currently unavailable. While further information regarding familial searching or reporting near matches is publicly unavailable, policy arrangements in England and the United States are considered below to shed light on the various familial searching policy arrangements.
Familial searching policies or regulations are quintessential, as the "nature of familial searching means that most if not all of the families nominated by the list will have no involvement in the crime in question" (Curran and Buckleton 2008: 164 ; see also Haimes 2006; Williams and Johnson 2006; Murphy 2010) . It is for several technical, social, ethical, legal, and fiscal reasons that the English police, the NDNAD strategy board, and forensic science providers have been developing regulations and protocols to mitigate potential societal threats and to carefully manage familial searching in criminal inquiries (Maguire et al. 2014) . The United States has a comparable mode of regulating familial searching. Currently, it is only allowed in California, Colorado, Texas, and Virginia; these states apply protocols for familial searching in their individual state DNA databases in unsolved cases if all leads are exhausted. 15 A pending bill titled Utilizing DNA Technology to Solve Cold Cases Act of 2011," if accepted by the US Senate and House of Representatives, allows the FBI to conduct "familial searches for DNA samples collected from crime scenes in State investigations" when no identical DNA matches were obtained in murder, manslaughter, and sexual abuse or attempts to commit such crimes (US Congress 2011). If this bill is enacted, it will allow familial searches utilizing CODIS instead of the individual state DNA databases. A significant advantage of full-fledged legislation for governing familial searching-which was commenced in the Netherlands in April 2012 (Toom 2012b ) and may be enacted in the United States-is that it renders these practices more transparent and thus contributes to holding law enforcement agencies and agents, as well as policy makers, accountable. 16 The absence of adherence to any of these principles, as well as the unavailability of any further information or rules for this application, significantly limits legitimacy and acceptability of familial searching in Singapore. (4) The status of any case in which such a familial match was found" (US Congress 2011). In addition to this information, sound assessment of familial searching practices with regard to their proportionality necessarily requires information about the total number of investigations against persons and families, interrogations of these "persons and families of interest," and arrests of suspect persons and families.
and Thailand, already have forensic DNA laboratories and are in the process of setting up national DNA databases. For example, pending in the Philippines is a legal framework for the governance of forensic DNA practices (the DNA Analysis Enhancement Act of 2010; for further discussion see De Ungria and Jose 2010) , and Malaysia, after years of postponing it, enacted its Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Identification Regulations on 1 September 2012, which governs, among others, Malaysia's forensic DNA databank (Republic of Malasia 2012). In addition to these two jurisdictions, Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia all stated that they desire a DNA database, yet no public available documents indicate that they have succeeded thus far. 17 Based on these national efforts and the AFSN's commitment to furthering regional cooperation and collaboration, as well as the standardized DNA typing kits that are being utilized all over the world and digitally managed with the aforementioned CODIS software, it is assumed that AFSN members are considering the possibility of transnational exchange of DNA data in the reasonably near future. Singapore would make an interesting partner for such exchange as it has a high influx of foreign laborers, who may commit crimes in Singapore but are never arrested. In addition, given the substantial national database of Singapore, neighboring countries may be interested to search the Singapore database for matches with known individuals.
Transnational exchange of DNA data can be achieved through various mechanisms. A first such mechanism was launched in 2005 by INTERPOL when it set up the DNA Gateway, a centrally administered stand-alone database to which INT-ERPOL member countries can voluntarily upload DNA profiles from subjects, traces, missing persons, and unidentified bodies (INTERPOL 2011; McCartney, Wilson, and Williams 2011) . Another model for the exchange of DNA profiles is the so-called Prüm Decision of the European Union, which became effective in 2008 and is aimed at enhancing cross-border cooperation, "particularly in combating terrorism, crossborder crime and illegal migration" (EU Council 2008; Toom 2010, 2013 ). An important trait of the Prüm Decision is that it is EU legislation that can and will be enforced by the European Union upon the member countries. Another aspect of the Prüm regime is that the exchange occurs on a daily basis and is fully automatic. A pitfall of the Prüm Decision was that the EU Parliament, as well as national parliaments of member states, was sidestepped when the EU Commission decided to adopt the Prüm regime; it has consequently been criticized as lacking legitimacy, transparency, and acceptability (Bellanova 2008; McCartney, Wilson, and Williams 2011 18 Agreements have been made between the United States and (at least) Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Czech, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Estonia, Greece, Denmark, and South Korea. These agreements still have to be ratified by the national parliaments-it is currently unknown if and when the If AFSN member states decide that transnational exchange of DNA data is viable, and if this is supported by the various governments, then they may decide to model transnational exchange in the Southeast Asian region according to the Prüm model (automatic, obligatory), the INTERPOL model (analog, voluntarily), or a mixture of both systems. It remains to be seen whether or not Singapore and the other Southeast Asian countries will decide to commence transnational DNA exchange routinely. Before any decision would be made, AFSN members should be encouraged not only to look at mechanisms for transnational exchange but also to advocate further discussion to convince several national constituencies and other stakeholders about the (perceived) necessity for, legitimacy, and acceptability of transnational exchange. In this process of moral and factual persuasion, such organizational principles as due process, individual rights, transparency, and accountability will certainly add to making a compelling argument for transnational DNA exchange. Such a process of persuasion is meaningful only if more information becomes available regarding, for example, transnational crime in the Southeast Asian region, the various rules for inclusion in databases, size and structure of databases, and quality and democratic control of custody and exchange.
Trumping Communitarianism
Liberalism and communitarianism have figured prominently in discussions about how to govern forensic DNA practices. Despite the prominence of these two political philosophies and their underlying values, no studies have looked at the governance of forensic DNA practices in a country governed according to communitarian logic. To fill this lacuna in the literature, this article considers Singapore as a country governed according to such logic. Etzioni (2006: 215) advocates the "good communitarian society," which is characterized by a conscientious weighing of rights of the individual and communal needs, as well as that the community should be morally persuaded and subsequently accept that balance.
On first sight, individual rights and communal needs in Singapore's forensic DNA practices are "balanced" not least because Singapore rolled out forensic DNA practices in quite similar ways as liberal democratic countries. Yet Singapore's government is rolling out forensic DNA practices at a much faster pace: by early 2012, Singapore's national DNA database already contained a similar percentage of its population compared with the American CODIS, yet achieved this in a shorter time span; it may also eventually outgrow the English NDNAD. Furthermore, Singapore is regarded as one of the safest countries in the world, consequently having (statistically) fewer subjects whose DNA would potentially be included in a criminal database. The most logical explanation for Singapore's rather quick expanding DNA database is that inclusion criteria are very broadly formulated and that law enforcement officials have embraced a policy of swabbing a considerable percentage of the population. Hence, based on these provisional interpretations, and compared with the United States and England, Singapore's approach to policy and governance of forensic DNA practices is communitarian as it favors the common good and social responsibility over liberty and individual rights. However, it is debatable whether or not its inclusion regime, at least from a liberal democratic point of view, is imbalanced and disproportional.
Etzioni's second yardstick leaves less room for discussion and interpretation. Although the very restrictive rules for inclusion in Singapore's DNA database were accepted after Parliamentarian scrutiny, exact data about current practices have never been published or made publicly available: it is unknown how many subject profiles are uploaded annually, how many profiles of cleared suspects have been removed, how many juveniles are included in the database, how many crime scene profiles are uploaded annually, in how many cases the database provides investigative leads, and how many of those leads result in successful prosecution. Furthermore, it is currently unknown how data in the database are applied exactly, and for what other purposes the database and forensic biobank are being utilized. Applications and purpose are important here, not only since familial searching and transnational exchange are controversial, but also because the forensic biobank-containing DNA samples of everyone arrested after 2003-could be used for scientific research or even biomedical research; such would be a gross violation of bioethical values (Toom 2012a: 165) . Echoing the concept of biolegality (Lynch and McNally 2009; Lawless 2013) , these instances articulate only the bio without legality.
Summarizing the above, it can be concluded that Singapore's government is deficient in providing any meaningful information about its forensic DNA practices. Second, the government is unwilling to adhere to such governing principles as transparency and accountability. Third, and related to the second, Singapore's citizenry cannot be persuaded about a balanced forensic DNA practice where individual rights (privacy, bodily integrity) are made secondary to the common good in narrowly defined and agreed upon circumstances. And fourth, some applications and purposes may be practiced without designated legislation, rendering them extralegal practices. It is therefore safe to say that forensic DNA practices in Singapore are not much governed according to versions of communitarianism. Instead, communitarianism is trumped by the crime control model; the common good is defined as "safety" and the "war against crime and terrorism" at the expense of individual rights (privacy, bodily integrity) and legal principles (proportionality, presumption of innocence, and onus of proof ). In contrast with liberal democratic articulations of biolegality, which are intimately connected with civil liberties and restrictions to those liberties in accordance with a nation's code of criminal procedure (Toom 2012b ), Singapore's biolegality may be considered an articulation of the penal code and its policing practices. In other words, the latter's biolegal progress is by and large steered by a list of punishable crimes, whereas those of the former are the result of exceptions to individual rights.
This author favors a liberalist and due process governance model for forensic DNA practices. Yet it remains an open question under what situated conditions subjects living in a state where forensic DNA practices are governed according to the crime control model find themselves empowered or disempowered by DNA typing technologies (see Prainsack and Toom 2010) . Were any scholars to conduct further research into forensic DNA practices in countries other than liberal democracies, then a focus on specific groups (e.g., minorities, refugees, inmates) disproportionately affected by these technologies may overcome the unwillingness of government officials to share knowledge of the effects of their forensic DNA regimes (cf. Cole 2007; Prainsack and Kitzberger 2009; Machado, Santos, and Silva 2011; Machado and Prainsack 2012; Skinner 2013) . Focusing on members of such groups and documenting under what exact circumstances they feel empowered or disempowered by a state's apparatus may bring to the fore how individuals' bodies are being subjected by science and law, how subjectivities are produced and become enacted, or how surveillance may be resisted or used to one's advantage. Such further studies should not only consider forensic DNA technologies but also examine how those states and their governance principles and mechanisms contribute to the ordering of power relations between the state and its subjects. Another significant issue regards trust, in particular, how is trust engaged by those who promote crime control values at the expense of due process ones? Or do Singaporeans not trust law enforcement agencies so much and instead rely on forensic DNA typing technologies, which, in this era of such forensic fictions as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and Bones, are often perceived as infallible truth machines with the capacity to correct an unduly powerful state utilizing the crime control model (Kruse 2010) ? It may be possible that Singapore's citizenry finds it comforting that the epistemological authority of forensic DNA typing technologies stands between them, the state, and the crime control model.
